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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH 
GENE WHEADON and 
DEANE WHEADON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
GEORGE B. PEARSON and 
SARAH K. PEARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9696 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by which plaintiffs seek to estab-
lish the existence of a permanent easement or right-of-
way across defendants' land. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, on 
motion of defendants, on the ground of res judicata. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the lower court's order of 
dismissal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are two suits involved in this appeal, both of 
which were filed in the District Court for Salt Lake 
County. In the first suit, No. 129450, plaintiffs, through 
other counsel, sued defendants for the purpose of estab-
lishing the existence of a permanent easement, a ppur-
tenant to plaintiffs' land, across defendants' land. The 
complaint in the first suit (the record in the first suit was 
not serially numbered by the lower court) sets forth 
plaintiffs' cause of action for establishment of the said 
right-of-way on the theory of adverse user over a period 
in excess of twenty years (paragraph 3). At the pre-
trial hearing, the lower court found that plaintiff Gene 
Wheadon was the owner of both plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' parcels for a five-year period within the period of 
claimed adverse use, and concluded that there was not a 
sufficient period of adverse use aside from the said five-
year period to establish plaintiffs' claim. Upon motion 
of defendants' counsel, it therefore granted summary 
judgment against plaintiffs (see pre-trial order). 
Present counsel then filed in plaintiffs' behalf a mo-
tion for new trial with affidavits in support thereof, and 
the matter was argued by respective counsel to the trial 
court. The trial court denied the motion, and the present 
suit was commenced shortly thereafter. 
In this second suit, No. 136131, plaintiffs again seek 
to establish a permanent easement appurtenant to their 
land across defendants' land, but on an entirely differ-
ent cause of action. The present complaint (R. 1) sets 
forth a cause of action based on an implied e·asement 
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brought into being at the division of a parcel of land 
into two contiguous parcels, one of which was burdened 
during the single ownership by a right-of-way for the 
benefit of the other. Defendants' counsel moved to dis-
miss the present complaint on the ground that the issues 
involved were res judicata by reason of the summary 
judgment in the first suit. The· trial court granted that 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON THE 
GROUND OF RES JUDICATA. 
The general rule is stated in 30-A American Juris-
prudence Judgments, section 363, to the effect that a 
final judgment on the merits is a bar to a later action by 
the same parties involving the· same claim, demand, and 
cause of action. That text then continues (p. 403): 
If, however, the two suits do not involve the same 
claim, demand, and cause of action, such effect 
will not be ordinarily given to the prior judgment. 
In this respect, it is worthy of notice that there 
must be not only identity of subject matter, but 
also of the cause of action, so that a judgment in 
a former action does not operate as a bar to a 
subsequent action where the cause of action is not 
the same, although each action relates to the 
same subject matter .... 
Further statement of the rule is set forth in section 373 
of the same work : 
The rule granting conclusiveness to a judgment 
in regard to issues of fact which could prope·rly 
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have been determined in the action is generally 
limited to cases inYolYing the- samL' eanse of action. 
Where a second action is upon a different claim, 
demand, or cause of action, the established rule is 
that the judgment in the first action operates as 
an estoppel only as to the points or questions 
actually litigated and determined, and not as to 
matters not litigated in the former action, even 
though such matters might properly have been 
determined therein. Accordingly, the view is gPn-
erally taken that before the clortrine of res judi-
cata is applied in such cases, it should appear that 
the precise question involved in the subsequent 
action was determined in the former action. rrhese 
rules prevail whether the judgment is used in 
pleading as a technical estoppel, or is relied on by 
way of evidence as conclusive per se. 
The author at 50 Corpus Jurus Secundum, Judgments, 
section 648, p. 82, states the rule similarly: 
Although a judgment may be conclusive evidence 
on any point formerly litigated and decided be-
tween the same parties, ... yet it is not pleadable 
in bar of a second action unless it is founded on 
the same identical of substantially identical cause 
of action, notwithstanding the parties are the 
same, the circumstances comparable, and the de-
fense similar, or the same property is involved. In 
applying this rule, numerous particular cases have 
adjudicated the lack of identity of causes of action 
as against the claim of res judicata. On the other 
hand, where the requisite identity of causes of 
action is shown to exist, the former judgment may 
be interposed to prevent a second recovery by 
plaintiff on the same cause, or to bar the mainte-
nance of a second action on a cause against which 
defendant has already successfully defended him-
self, and a party cannot evade the rule by changing 
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the form of his complaint. It must clearly appear 
or be demonstated on what cause of action the for-
mer judgment was rendered and that it is the same 
as the cause of action brought forward in the sec-
ond suit; and no estoppel arises if this matter can 
be made only inference or conjecture. Any doubt 
as to the identity of the causes of action in the two 
suits must be resolved in favor of the party against 
whom the plea of res judicata is asserted. 
And again, from section 652 of the same work at p. 97 : 
... However, identity of the subject matter is not 
alone a sufficient test; the true requirement is that 
the causes of action in the two suits shall be the 
same. Undoubtedly the subject matter involved 
in the two actions must be the same, for other-
wise there could not be an identity of the causes of 
action; but the same transaction or state of facts 
may give rise to distinct or successive causes of 
action, and the judgment on one will not bar a 
suit on another, . . . Therefore, a judgment in a 
former suit, although between the same parties 
and relating to the same subject matter, is not a 
bar to a subsequent action, when the cause of 
action is not the same. . .. 
Under the comment to section 63 of the Restatement, 
Judgments, the same rule is explained in the rationale : 
Where the plaintiff has brought an action and 
judgment has been rendered against him on the 
merits, and thereafter he brings a new action 
against the defendant, it is important to determine 
whether the new action is based on the same or a 
different cause of action. If the action is based on 
the same cause of action, the plaintiff is barred by 
the prior judgment, regardless of the issues which 
were litigated on the prior action. On the other 
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hand, if the new action is based on a different cause 
of action, the judgment is conclusive only as to 
questions actually litigated and determined in the 
prior action. 
This court has previously am1ounced the same rule. 
In Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena 1llining eu., 77 
U. 362, 296 P. 231 (1931), this court approved the rule 
from 15 R. C. L. 977 set forth in respondent's brief in 
that case, that ''a judgment concludes the parties only as 
to the facts actually decided, or which were necessarily 
involved in it and without the existence of which such 
judgment could not have been rendered, and is not con-
clusive as to matters not litigated or material to recovery 
in the former suit.'' More recently, in Ea.st Mill Creel.· 
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 U. 315, 159 P. 2d 863 
(1945), this court rejected the defendant's claim of res 
judicata and stated, " ... On the other hand, where the 
claim, demand, or cause of action is different in the two 
cases then the former is res judicata. of the latter only to 
the extent that the former actually raised and decided the 
same points and issues which are raised in the latter.'' 
The court then cited a number of decisions in support of 
the rule, including the Glen Allen case, quoted from above. 
The decision in Voyles, et al. v. Straka, 77 U. 171, 292 P. 
913 ( 1930) is to the same effect, the court there quoting 
from 34 C. J. 874 with approval. 
The question then becomes one of determining 
whether the causes of action involved in the two suits are 
identical or whether they are separate or distinct. Amer-
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ican Jurisprudence, Judgments, Vol. 30-A, section 365, 
states the test as follows: 
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if 
it is doubtful whether a second action is for the 
same cause of action as the first, the test generally 
applied is to consider the identity of facts essential 
to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence 
would sustain both. If the same, facts or evidence 
would sustain both, the two actions are considered 
the same within the rule that the judgment in the 
former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, how-
ever, the two actions rest upon different states 
of facts, or if different proofs would be, required 
to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no 
bar to the maintenance of the other. It has been 
said that this method is the best and most accurate 
test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in 
subsequent proceedings between the same parties, 
and it has even been designated as infallible. On 
the other hand, it has been declared that the mere 
fact that the same evidence may be admissible un-
der the pleadings in each action is not necessarily 
controlling. It has also been held that the main-
tenance of the second action may be precluded 
even though different grounds for relief are inter-
posed. It is clear that the identity of causes of 
action may not be determined by the test whether 
the claims might have been joined in a single 
action. 
The same rule is stated in 50 Corpus J urus Secundum, 
Judgments, section 648~ at p. 88: 
A "cause of action" for the purpose of applying 
the doctrine of res judicata is the fact or facts 
which establish or give rise to a right of action, 
the existence of which affords a party a right to 
judicial relief. The number and variety of the facts 
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alleged do not constitutl' more than 01H' <'a llHP of 
action as long as their result, "·hether tlwy hl' eon-
sidered severally or in combination, iH the \'io-
lation of but one right by a singlP lPgal wrong. In 
determining whether causes of net ion an· idPntical 
so as to warrant application of the rule of 1'<'H 
judicata, the test most commonly stntl'd is to HH<'<'1'-
tain whether the same evidPnre which iR neceHHa ry 
to sustain the second action would have been suf-
ficient to authorize a recovery in the first; if so the 
prior judgment is a bar; otherwise it is not. If, 
however, the evidence offered in the second suit iR 
sufficient to authorize a recovery, but could not 
have produced a different result in the first suit, 
the failure of plaintiff in the first suit is no bar to 
his recovery in the other suit, although it is for 
the same cause- of action. It has been held that a 
proper test on an issue of identity of causes of 
action is to inquire whe-ther the judgment sought 
will be inconsistent with the prior judgment; if 
such inconsistency is not shown, the prior judg-
ment is not a bar .... 
The Restatement, Judgments, at section 61, states the 
same rule : ''Where a judgment is rendered in favor of the 
plaintiff or where- a judgment on the merits is rendered 
in favor of the defendant the plaintiff is precluded from 
subsequently maintaining a second action based upon the 
same transaction, if the evidence needed to sustain the 
second action would have sustained the first action.'' 
To summarize the foregoing authorities, the rule is 
that if the evidence necessary to sustain the second action 
would not have sustained the first, then res judicata is 
not a bar. 
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If the rule were otherwise, a plaintiff who proceeded 
on the wrong theory and thereby lost would be forever 
foreclosed from recovery, no matter how just his cause. 
That he is not so precluded is shown in the following 
statements of the correct rule, first from 50 Corpus J urus 
Secundum Judgments, section 649, at p. 90: "Where 
plaintiff is defe·ated in an action based on a certain 
theory of his legal rights or as to the legal effects of a 
given transaction or state of facts through failure to sub-
stantiate his view of the case, this will not as a rule pre-
clude him from renewing the litigation ... on a new and 
more correct theory .... " And again, from the Restate-
ment, Judgments, section 65, comment on sub-sec-
tion (2)h.: 
Where, as at common law, the plaintiff in an action 
at law has to select a particular form of action, 
and judgment is given for the defendant on the 
ground that the plaintiff has brought the wrong 
form of action, the judgment is not on the merits, 
and the plaintiff is not precluded from subse-
quently maintaining an action in the proper form 
of action. Thus, if the plaintiff brought an action 
of covenant alleging that the defendant made a 
promise under seal but it was shown at the trial 
that the promise was not under seal and verdict 
and judgment were for this reason given for the 
defendant, the plaintiff is not precluded by the 
judgment from maintaining an action of assump-
sit. Conversely, where the plaintiff brought an 
action of assumpsit and it was shown that the 
promise sued upon was under seal, and judgment 
was accordingly given the defendant, the plaintiff 
is not precluded from maintaining an action in cov-
enant. So also, where judgment was given for the 
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defendant in an action of trespass on the ground 
that case was the proper form of action, the plain-
tiff is not precluded from maintaining an action 
on the case. 
Where the forms of action have been abolished, a 
similar question may arise. Where the plajntiff 
in his complajnt bases his right of action on one 
theory, it is held in some States that he iR not en-
titled to recover on a different theory, even though 
he has alleged facts in his complaint sufficient to 
entitle him to recover on another theory and those 
facts are admitted or proved at the trial. If judg-
ment is given for the defendant on this ground, 
the plaintiff is not precluded from subsequently 
maintaining an action on the other theory. 
The complaints involved in the two suits in question 
here, might now be examined against the background of 
the legal principles discussed above. In the first suit, the 
gist of the cause of action is contained in paragraph 3 
of the complaint. It states: 
Along the East Jordan Canal bank, there has been 
a lane or road about fifteen or twenty feet in width 
which is now, and for more than thirty years has 
been, used by the plaintiffs, their grantors and 
predecessors in interest and by divers other per-
sons as a vehicular and pedestrian road to gain 
ingress and egress to and from the above described 
real property of plaintiff and to other real prop-
erty located by plaintiffs' land, under claim of 
right of user, and plaintiffs and others have no-
toriously and openly used said lane and road 
under said right for more than thirty years, which 
lane and road extends from a country road, 13800 
South, along the canal to the plaintiff's property. 
10 
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If the plaintiffs have the-re set forth any ground upon 
which the court could grant them an easement over de-
fendants' land, it is on the theory of adverse use in excess 
of twenty years, or in other words, on a prescriptive right 
cause of action (2 American Law of Property, sections 
8.44-8.63, 2 Thompson, Real Property [1961 replacement], 
sections 335-350). 
The pertinent portions of the complaint in the second 
suit are contained in paragraphs 4 through 9 (R. 2-3) 
and are of such length that to quote them verbatim would 
unduly extend this brief. In summary, they allege that 
the parties' respective parcels were previously held in 
single ownership, that while so held defendants' parcel 
was used for the benefit of plaintiffs' parcel, that such 
use continued for a long period and was of a visible, 
apparent, continuous and permanent nature, that the 
single parcel was seve·red into the two contiguous parcels 
now owned by the parties, and that the continued use of 
defendants' parcel by plaintiffs is necessary to the bene-
ficial enjoyment of plaintiffs' land. 
The latter complaint thus sets forth plaintiffs' right 
to an easement over defendants' land on an implied ease-
ment theory (2 American Law of Property, sections 8.31-
8.43, 2 Thompson, Real Property [1961 replacement], 
sections 351-361}. This cause of action - implied ease-
ment- is entirely different from and wholly unrelated 
to the prescriptive right cause of action set forth in the 
first complaint. In fact, neither cause of action has a 
main element in common with the other, though some of 
11 
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the supporting elements are the same. A side by side 
comparison will illustrate the difference: 
Prescriptive Right 
( 1) open, notorious 
adverse use 
(2) in excess of twenty 
years 
( 3) of a continuous and 
uninterrupted nature 
Implied Eascmc11f 
( 1) single ov.rnershi p 
(2) severance 
(3) apparent, visible prior 
use over long period 
( 4) reasonable necessity to 
beneficial enjoyment 
of dominant estate 
The test as to whether a second suit is barred Is 
whether it asserts the same cause of action as that on 
which a judgment has been previously entered. And 
whether a cause of action is the same as a prior one turns 
on whether the evidence necessary to prove it would have 
proved the first one. In this case the causes of action 
have very little in common; in fact, proof of the second 
precludes proof of the first. They are incompatible. 
Thus, plaintiffs' second suit and the cause of the action 
therein alleged come squarely within the rules herein-
above set forth. 
It is noteworthy that at the time the trial court 
denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in the first suit, 
plaintiffs were out of court on a summary judgment 
against them. The motion for new trial was an attempt 
to get back in court so that the pleadings could be amend-
ed and the implied easement cause of action be presented 
to the court. The court denied the motion, for reasons not 
known. All that is known is that the court refused to 
12 
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pass on the question of implied easement, on the merits. 
This court has heretofore stated that a judgment is not 
res judicata as to matters which a court expressly refuses 
to determine, Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U. 2d 404, 285 P. 2d 
839, at 841 (1955). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint in the second suit, since it states an entirely new 
and independent cause of action against defendants. No 
court has yet passed on plaintiffs' claim there asserted, 
and they are entitled to their day in court. 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEAN AND BEAN 
K. RoGER BEAN 
50 North Main Street 
Layton, Utah 
Attorneys for Pla.intiffs 
and A. ppellatn.ts 
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